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A Preliminary Report on the Bakke Case 
William Van Alstyne 
Introduction 
A full generation has passed since racially "separate but 
equal" public schools were constitutionally condemned 
by a unanimous Supreme Court. During the inter- 
vening decades there have been many other race-re- 
lated Supreme Court decisions, but none as momentous 
as Brown v. Board of Education. On June 28, 1978, 
however, a case to rival Brown in the sheer intensity of 
public interest came down - the case everyone knows 
simply as "Bakke." The question it decided was 
whether racially separate and unequal admission stan- 
dards are also constitutionally condemned. From there 
on, however, the similiarity of Bakke to Brown ends. 
The lapse of years between Brown and Bakke is 
reflected on the face of their very different opinions. In 
condemning compulsory racial school segregation, 
Brown spoke with a confident and unanimous simplicity. 
In retrospect, perhaps it is to be faulted on that account, 
although I have not seen in all the critiques of Brown a 
work product overall more effective than the original 
succinct opinion. Bakke, on the other hand, is a study in 
contrast in virtually every imaginable respect. 
There is a "judgment" for the Court - but no opinion 
for the Court. Rather, there are six separate opinions, 
none on any issue representing the view of more than 
the barest majority. The outcome itself is by bare ma- 
jority, five-to-four, but even that degree of consensus is 
deceptive. Four of the five justices on the prevailing 
side voted to affirm (in favor of Bakke) solely on the 
basis of a statutory interpretation which all of the other 
five Justices rejected. The fifth Justice on the prevailing 
side voted to affirm solely on the basis of his own 
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment which four 
other Justices rejected and which the remaining four 
Justices declined to endorse. 
It is thus not inaccurate to say that the Bakke case 
was "decided" by one Justice (Mr. Justice Powell) on a 
rationale which, so far as it depended (as it did) on an 
interpretation of the Constitution, was a minority view 
of one-to-four; and insofar as the case was "decided" by 
four Justices on the basis of a statutory interpretation 
(which it was), it represents a minority view of four-to- 
five! Small wonder that the immediately ensuing news 
specials, the evening of June 28th, seemed confusing. 
What follows is but a brief r6sum6 of the case in its 
principal features plus some observations respecting its 
immediate implications for the academic community. 
A Summary of the Case 
The University of California opened a new medical 
school at its Davis campus in 1968. As of 1973, the 
medical school had established a dual admissions proc- 
ess: one for regular applicants, open to applicants of all 
races, from whom the best would be selected on the 
basis of grades, test scores, and interview results, to fill 
eighty-four places in the freshman class; another for 
special applicants, limited to blacks, Chicanos, Asians, 
and American Indians unlikely to be admitted in com- 
petition with the regular applicants, from whom the 
best would be selected on the basis of grades, test 
scores, and interview results, to fill sixteen places in the 
freshman class. 
A reasonably accurate description of the second ad- 
missions process might be to call it a "minimum racial 
minority set-aside." It was plainly not a maximum ra- 
cial minority quota, as of course applicants of all races 
were considered on completely equal terms within the 
regular admissions process. (In fact, for 1973 and 1974 
combined, twenth-four racial minority students [most 
of whom were Asian] were among the 168 enrolled 
pursuant to that process - 14 per cent of the total.) 
Neither was it exactly a minimum racial minority 
quota: the medical school was not determined to fill it 
"at all costs," but only to the extent that those eligible 
for consideration were deemed capable of coping with 
the regular curriculum, once admitted. In 1973 and 
1974 alike, however, a full complement of sixteen stu- 
dents was admitted in each year pursuant to this second 
admissions process. 
Allan Bakke applied in 1973 and 1974 to be admitted. 
Whether he would have been admitted but for the 16 
per cent racial minority set-aside cannot be known. In 
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comparison with others admitted under the regular 
process, he was deemed less qualified - but not at all 
much less so. Indeed, the university conceded that had 
he been considered on equal terms with all other appli- 
cants for the full complement of 100 places (rather than 
the lesser complement of 84 places) each year, he might 
in fact have been among the best 100; i.e., the univer- 
sity conceded that it could not show that even had it not 
reserved 16 places each year as a separate, racial minor- 
ity set-aside, Allan Bakke would still have been re- 
jected. 
Objectively, moreover, a comparison of Allan 
Bakke' s admission statistics (exclusive of his interview 
scores) with the average of the sixteen special admittees 
for each of the two years in which he was rejected and 
in which they were all accepted, is striking: 
Medical College Admission Test (Percentiles) 
Science Overall Quanti- Sci- Gen'l 
GPA GPA Verbal tative ence Info. 
1973 
Bakke 3.44 3.51 96 94 97 72 
16 Others (av.) 2.62 2.88 46 24 35 33 
1974 
Bakke 3.44 3.51 96 94 97 72 
16 Others (av.) 2.42 2.62 34 30 37 18 
No other useful comparison can be made between 
any other qualifications Allan Bakke may (or may not) 
have had. No such comparison is possible because the 
Davis Medical School made none and, indeed, ar- 
ranged its admissions procedures in such a fashion that 
none could be made. A wholly different committee 
from that which interviewed each of the sixteen special 
admittees interviewed Allan Bakke; no attempt was 
made to standardize the interview ratings employed by 
the different committees - because the special admit- 





or "subjectively** with Allan Bakke, but only 
with each other. (Even as things were, however, appli- 
cants admitted under the special program included a 
significant number whose "bench-mark scores** - in- 
clusive of points added on the strength of information 
elicited pursuant to the interview process - were "sig- 
nificantly lower*' than Allan Bakke' s bench-mark score.) 
Displaced from admission under these circum- 
stances, Allan Bakke challenged the legality of the 
school's racial double standards (i.e., the more highly 
competitive one for all "regular** applicants, the em- 
phatically less competitive one available only to dis- 
advantaged blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and American In- 
dians) in a California Superior Court. He did so on 
three distinct grounds each of which, he alleged, for- 
bade the unequal treatment to which he had been 
subjected. The first was the following provision as it 
then appeared (in 1974) in the California Constitution: 
[N]or shall any citizen, or class of citizen, be granted privi- 
leges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not 
be granted to all citizens. 
The second was the following provision from Title VI of 
the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance. 
The third was the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution: 
[N]or [shall any state] deny to any person within its juris- diction the equal protection of the laws. 
The Superior Court held against the Medical School on 
all three grounds, enjoining the use of race for admis- 
sions purposes, but declining to order Allan Bakke*s 
admission because of uncertainty whether he necessar- 
ily would have made it into the class in either year even 
in the absence of the special admissions program. On 
appeal (by both parties), by a vote of six- to-one the 
California Supreme Court affirmed solely on the basis 
of the fourteenth amendment, ordering Bakke' s admis- 
sion because the University was unable to show that 
without its (unconstitutional) program, Bakke would 
not have made it. In short, the California Supreme 
Court held that it was the University's burden to show, 
if it could, that its unconstitutional use of race was 
without impact upon Alan Bakke's admission, and not 
the reverse. 
In the Supreme Court (which stayed the order admit- 
ting Bakke until the Court decided the merits of the 
case), only the federal questions (Title VI and the 
fourteenth amendment) were within the discretion of 
the Court to examine. The Justices divided in the fol- 
lowing ways: First, four Justices (Stevens, Stewart, Bur- 
ger, and Rehnquist) concluded that the fourteenth 
amendment question need not be addressed. Rather, 
they interpreted the quoted provision from the Civil 
Rights Act as a flat prohibition of any school which 
receives federal assistance from employing more rigor- 
ous admissions standards under which are excluded 
some students who might otherwise have been ad- 
mitted but for the reservation of places for students 
judged by more permissive standards solely because of 
their race. Holding also that Title VI could be relied 
upon by a private litigant (and not simply by HEW for 
the purpose of withholding any federal assistance from 
an institution operating in violation of its "colorblind" 
requirement), they therefore voted to affirm the Cali- 
fornia Supreme Court strictly on this statutory ground. 
In brief, in their view Allan Bakke quite clearly had 
been "subjected to discrimination** on the basis of his 
race; such discrimination was plainly forbidden against 
anyone, white or black. It was clearly within the power 
of Congress so to provide in respect to any institution 
receiving federal funds, and the decision below should 
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therefore be affirmed without gratuitous speculation as 
to whether, in the absence of that controlling Act of 
Congress, some other applicable law or constitutional 
provision would require the same result. 
The remaining five Justices concluded, however, that 
the Act of Congress was not conclusive per se. Rather, 
all of them interpreted Title VI to forbid only such uses 
of race as would otherwise be condemned by the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; i.e., 
that despite its different wording, Title VI was meant to 
provide that institutions receiving federal funds were 
forbidden from using a racial double admission stan- 
dard if, but only if, such a use would constitute a denial 
of "equal protection/' 
One of these five Justices, Mr. Justice Powell, con- 
cluded that the Davis plan did violate the equal pro- 
tection clause (and thereby Title VI as well), thus ulti- 
mately placing his vote with the four Justices already 
holding in Allan Bakke's favor strictly on the basis of 
Title VI alone. Because Justice Powell concluded that 
race could be considered, albeit in a different fashion 
than it has been used at Davis, however, he voted to 
reverse that part of the California Supreme Court judg- 
ment forbidding any use of race. The other four Justices 
joined in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan, 
concluding that the Davis plan did not violate the equal 
protection clause (and thus also did not violate Title 
VI), resulting in their decision to dissent. 
In addition to these three principal opinions, there 
were three others. Mr. Justice White, while fully con- 
curring in Brennan's opinion (on the merits of the 
constitutional issue) wrote separately to record his view 
that the provision in Title VI could not serve to support 
a private cause of action; rather, in his view, loss of 
federal funds was the only sanction contemplated by 
Congress. Mr. Justice Blackmun fully concurred in 
Brennan's opinion, but added separate remarks of his 
own as to why, in his view, the Davis plan did not deny 
Allan Bakke the equal protection of the laws. Mr. Jus- 
tice Marshall, also fully concurring in Brennan's opinion, 
added still more elaborate remarks of his own, defend- 
ing the constitutionality of the Davis Plan. 
More graphically, one correct perspective of the case 
is shown in the chart at right. 
The Obvious Instability of the Decision 
Whether anyone other than Allan Bakke will hereaf- 
ter succeed in challenging racial preferential admission 
programs, or whether many may succeed in doing so, is 
utterly uncertain. Some of the reasons for this uncer- 
tainty are obvious, others far less obvious. 
Among the obvious reasons are these. First, since 
four of the Justices on the prevailing side reached their 
conclusion solely on the basis of a strict "colorblind" 
interpretation of Title VI which, however, a majority of 
the Court in fact rejected in the same case, there is no 
reason to believe that any of these Justices would neces- 
sarily insist upon their minority interpretation of Title 
VI in any subsequent case. A majority of the Court has 
said that the provision in Title VI does no more than 
Brennan 
Stewart Whlte Marshall Burger 
Rehnquist 1, Title VI applies if but 




bans this use of race, / tection clause 
pro- 
.1 / Pe"00- 

			 | / 2. This use of race does 
not offend the equal 
/ protection clause; and 
/ therefore 
/ 3. Title VI does not 
/ apply. 
' Powell 
1. Title VI applies if but only if this use of 
race offends the equal protection clause; 
2. This particular use of race does offend 
the equal protection clause; and there- 
fore 
3. Title VI applies. 
Result: Decision below (in Allan Bakke's favor) affirmed, 
judgment below reversed insofar as it forbade any use of race. * (filed separate concurring opinions, but also joined the 
Brennan opinion) 
forbid whatever uses of racial classifications are other- 
wise forbidden by the fourteenth amendment; that in- 
terpretation being the prevailing one in the Bakke case 
itself (so far as the statute was concerned), it would be 
entirely proper for any or all of the Justices holding a 
contrary view in Bakke hereafter to acquiesce in that 
construction. 
Insofar as that may happen, then even in a case 
literally identical to the Bakke case (i.e., a case in- 
volving the very same kind of dual admission process as 
that which Davis used), Justices Stevens, Stewart, Rehn- 
quist, and Burger may each, for the first time, have 
occasion to state their own view as to whether such an 
affirmative action plan is, or is not, compatible with the 
fourteenth amendment (and, by the same token, consis- 
tent also with Title VI). If but one of the four asserts a 
view more nearly in agreement with Brennan's opinion 
in Bakke, rather than more nearly in agreement with 
Powell's opinion in Bakke, the result in this, a case 
literally the same as Bakke, would change: from five-to- 
four, to four(or fewer )-to-five(or more)! 
Second, there may be some public colleges or univer- 
sities which, because they are state schools, are of 
course bound by the fourteenth amendment - but not 
bound by Title VI insofar as they provide no "program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" to 
which the restrictions of Title VI apply. As to them, 
there being no Title VI basis upon which Justices Ste- 
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vens, Stewart, Rehnquist, or Burger could rely (even 
assuming they would persist in their 
" 
colorblind* ' inter- 
pretation of Title VI in every case where Title VI was 
applicable), each might then be compelled to address 
the legality of a Davis-type plan solely on the basis of 
the fourteenth amendment. Again, as explained above, 
if any one of them agrees with Brennan's more per- 
missive view of racial preferential admission programs, 
all plans at all such public institutions identical to the 
Davis plan in Bakke would be upheld. 
Third, none of the Justices addressing themselves to 
the fourteenth amendment issue took the view that the 
equal protection clause requires strict colorblindness 
even in respect to admission programs at state universi- 
ties. (It is interesting that among the more than three- 
score amicus briefs filed in Bakke, moreover, not one 
asserted an absolute colorblind interpretation of the 
equal protection clause. ) Indeed, the distance between 
Mr. Justice Powell's position respecting what use may 
be made of race for admission purposes and Mr. Justice 
Brennan's position is not terribly great. One such differ- 
ence was this: 
The Davis plan was defended on four grounds, one of 
which was that it reflected a not unreasonable attempt 
at social redress: i.e., that short-term favoritism of cer- 
tain racial minorities not now fairly competitive with 
others for medical school admission is a wholly appro- 
priate means of partial redress for disadvantages all 
persons identified as members of those minorities had 
been made to endure, in some degree, solely because of 
their race. That the Davis plan, viewed strictly as a 
conscientious effort toward such redress, might be im- 
perfect did not on that account make it uncon- 
stitutional. 
Mr. Justice Brennan (and the three Justices con- 
curring in his opinion) found this justification adequate 
per se to sustain the Davis plan against fourteenth 
amendment complaint. Mr. Justice Powell disagreed - 
but not completely. Rather, what he said was: 
We have never approved a classification that aids persons 
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the 
expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of 
judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitu- 
tional or statutory violations. . . .Petitioner [i.e., the Uni- 
versity of California Board of Regents] does not purport to 
have made, and is in no position to make, such findings. . . . 
Before relying upon these sorts of findings in establishing a 
racial classification, a government body must have the au- 
thority and capability to establish, in the record, that the 
classification is responsive to identified discrimination. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In turn, Mr. Justice Brennan characterized "the central 
meaning of today's opinions" (clearly meaning not just 
his own but Powell's as well) in the following way: 
Government may take race into account when it acts not to 
demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvan- 
tages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least 
when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, 
legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act 
in this area. [Emphasis added.] 
If, indeed, these passages represent "the central mean- 
ing" of the Bakke case, then presumably a racial-pref- 
erence admission program identical to the Davis plan 
would be sustained by a minimum vote of five-to-four, 
assuming nothing different about the plan but some- 
thing different only as to its origin and the plausibility 
of certain "findings" at that source. In Bakke itself, the 
Regents had denied that the University of California 
has ever discriminated against blacks, Chicanos, 
Asians, or American Indians. If, however, prior to an- 
other Bakke case the California legislature were to "re- 
examine" the legal and social history of that state, 
concluding with abundant illustrations that the state 
itself had in many specific ways since 1868 imposed 
race-related handicaps on these minorities (the task 
would be easiest by far in respect to "Asians"), in- 
clusive of its educational systems (examples would in 
fact not be difficult to supply), the appropriate legisla- 
tive predicate to sustain a Davis-type plan might well 
be laid. Indeed, it is not clear that the U.C. Board of 
Regents is itself precluded from doing so: that Board is 
a constitutional entity in California, quasi-legislative as 
well as administrative. At least so long as it confined 
itself to plausible findings of past inferior treatment of 
racial minorities within the University of California 
system itself (a matter it might, in Powell's words, be 
"in [a] position to make"), Davis-type plans might then 
be deemed "responsive to identified discrimination." 
At the legislative level, moreover, it is not clear that 
the "findings" (for which varieties of state-authorized 
racial minority preference systems may be thought ap- 
propriate forms of redress) need necessarily be related 
to "constitutional or statutory violations" within Cali- 
fornia itself. After all, ours has been a highly mobile 
population, and it may not be in the least irrational to 
conclude that many blacks, Chicanos, and Indians, con- 
fined as they were to separate and inferior schools in 
many states prior to moving to California, reflect di- 
rectly the handicaps unfairly resulting from those con- 
stitutional and statutory transgressions. Thus, should 
neither the Regents of the University of California nor 
the General Assembly of that State wish to enter find- 
ings of mea culpa respecting California in particular, 
still it might be possible to create a sufficient record 
permitting reinstatement of Davis-type plans. 
In certain other states, moreover, Mr. Justice Pow- 
ell's requirement of a "record" of "administrative find- 
ings of constitutional or statutory violations" by an 
appropriate agency clearly in a position to make such 
findings necessary and sufficient to sustain Davis-type 
plans on a pure redress theory can obviously be satis- 
fied. For decades after Plessy v. Ferguson, for instance, 
it is demonstrable that in North Carolina the state 
operated separate and unequal schools. (We may tend 
to forget that, even among the four school systems 
involved in the original quartet of cases decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1954, three of them had been deter- 
mined by the lower courts to be operating separate and 
unequal schools.) In brief, the "history" is doubtless 
there for those who deem it appropriate to use that 
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history for such purposes. So used, then again a plan 
identical to that at Davis may be deemed constitutional 
by at least five members of the same Court as that 
which decided in favor of Allan Bakke. 
Finally, Mr. Justice Powell indicated that racial pref- 
erential admission standards in public and in federally 
assisted private colleges may be continued even absent 
any adequate record relating the felt necessity for such 
a plan to previous acts of discrimination against the 
racial groups to be favored. By coincidence, with but 
very slight modification, presumably the very plan held 
invalid in Bakke itself can readily be reinstated. 
Justice Powell's opinion opens with an implied prem- 
ise within the equal protection clause: "racial and eth- 
nic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and 
thus call for the most exacting judicial examination/' 
That is not to say, however, that all such distinctions are 
forbidden. Rather, it is to say that "in order to justify 
the use of a suspect classification [race], a State must 
show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally 
permissible and substantial, and that its use of the 
classification is necessary ... to the accomplishment of 
its purpose/' 
One such purpose, Powell suggests, "is the attain- 
ment of a diverse student body" insofar as the overall 
quality of education provided within "an institution of 
higher education" is, in part, a function of the hetero- 
geneity of the participants themselves. In this sense, 
under some circumstances "race" may be as much a 
merit-plus (albeit an adventitious one) as economic 
background, geographic origin, work experience, mili- 
tary experience, or age. A determination to build in a 
nontrivial presence of ethnically diverse students within 
an institution of higher learning or professional school 
is thus directly related to its proper and important 
function of providing the fullest measure of quality 
education. So, Powell declares: 
Physicians serve a heterogenous population. An otherwise 
qualified medical student with a particular background - 
whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or 
disadvantaged - may bring to a professional school of med- 
icine experiences, outlooks and ideas that enrich the train- 
ing of its student body and better equip its graduates to 
render with understanding their vital service to humanity. 
As a consequence, when racially indifferent standards of 
admission would tend to screen out persons whose ab- 
sence may diminish the character and quality of the 
educational experience that it is the very function of the 
institution to provide, the school may take appropriate 
steps to count a particular "race or ethnic background 
... a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file," even as it 
may do so in respect to others according to their geo- 
graphic background or some equally fortuitous but edu- 
cationally germane consideration. In this sense, Mr. 
Justice Powell virtually acted upon the position urged 
in the AAUP amicus brief. 
The resulting adjustments to the Davis plan implied 
by Justice Powell need not be very great. First, the 
faculty must identify those characteristics (which may 
include, but presumably must not be restricted to, race) 
which, in its view, are educationally germane to a di- 
verse student body. Second, it should review its (aca- 
demic) admissions standards to determine whether, 
given the manner in which those standards may tend to 
eliminate all (or nearly all) persons having germane 
characteristics of a particular kind (race being one such 
characteristic), the standards should be modified to 
build in a sufficient "plus" for such applicants that a 
nontrivial number will show up in each entering class. 
Third, there should be no terminal dual or triple admis- 
sion tracks of admission, but only one track within 
which applicants are considered - the suggestion being 
that a person in Bakke's position may well have ac- 
quired some "plus" of his own equivalent (albeit relat- 
ing to a different quality) to some "plus" credited to 
another on racial grounds. Under these circumstances, 
"his qualifications [including any adventitious but 
nonetheless educationally germane qualifications] 
would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and 
he would have no basis to complain of unequal treat- 
ment under the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Looking back at the Davis plan, for comparison, 
several suggestions now seem obvious. First, since no 
significant numbers of blacks, Chicanos, or American 
Indians were admitted into the entering class when 
ethnic origin was left out of account entirely, doubtless 
substantial "plus" value may once again be assigned to 
all applications presented by such applicants. (Since a 
nontrivial number of "Asians" was admitted into the 
entering class without benefit of any such "plus," how- 
ever, continued assignment of such a "plus" on that 
basis presumably will lack adequate justification.) Sec- 
ond, in order that the plan pass muster as a bona fide 
"educational diversity" plan (and not merely a more 
doubtful, more narrowly based "racial diversity" plan), 
other kinds of attributes need to be identified and other 
applicants possessing such attributes to be given "plus" 
points of their own sufficient also to produce a non- 
trivial presence of persons with those attributes in each 
entering class. With these modifications, racial prefer- 
ential admission programs providing more favored 
treatment to ethnic minority students applying at pre- 
dominantly white institutions will evidently be deemed 
acceptable to not fewer than five Justices both under 
Title VI and under the fourteenth amendment. We 
may briefly summarize the "instability" of the Bakke 
case, then, as follows: 
1. Under either of two circumstances, a plan identical to 
that in Bakke, a Davis-type plan providing a special 
designated racial minority set-aside, may be held law- 
ful: 
(a). If, in a case involving a public university but not 
involving Title VI, either Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, 
or Burger acquiesces in Mr. Justice Brennan's view of 
the fourteenth amendment which is already shared 
by three other Justices: 
(b). If, in a case involving a public university subject 
to Title VI or a private university subject to Title VI, 
either Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, or Burger acqui- 
290 AAUP BULLETIN 
esces in what is already a majority's interpretation of 
Title VI (i.e., that it forbids only what the fourteenth 
amendment forbids), and also acquiesces in Mr. Jusice 
Brennan's view of the fourteenth amendment. 
2. A Davis-type plan may also be upheld even in the 
absence of either condition noted above, assuming only 
that appropriate findings are provided by a competent 
judicial, legislative, or administrative source, relating 
the plan as an appropriate remedy for identified dis- 
crimination against such racial minorities. 
3. In the absence of any of the above, a university 
subject to Title VI and/or the fourteenth amendment 
may nonetheless take race into account as a "plus" 
factor under circumstances where such consideration is 
a necessary means of providing reasonable ethnic diver- 
sity within the student body, as one of several kinds of 
"nonacademic" diversity which it believes contribute 
to the overall educational excellence of the institution. 
Two Countervailing Possibilities 
Despite what has been said thus far, there are at least 
two grounds on which racial preferential admissions 
programs in private and public institutions may none- 
theless be held illegal, even when remodeled in keeping 
with Mr. Justice Powell's opinion. First, it must be 
borne in mind that in Bakke itself, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the case to reexamine the legality of the Davis 
plan solely in terms of federal, rather than state, laws. 
The Court passed only on the reconcilability of the plan 
with Title VI and with the fourteenth amendment; it 
did not pass on its compatibility with any other federal 
statutes (which Bakke's attorney might have overlooked 
in first bringing the case). 
Second, the reader will recall that Allan Bakke origi- 
nally relied on an express provision in the California 
Constitution, quite apart from his reliance upon Title 
VI and the fourteenth amendment - and that the Cali- 
fornia Superior Court held in Bakke's favor on this 
ground, as well as the two federal grounds. Thereafter, 
however, the state constitutional issue disappeared 
from the case: the California Supreme Court did not 
rely upon it, but neither did it disapprove the use made 
of it by the Superior Court. Rather, the state Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court solely 
on the basis of its view of the fourteenth amendment - 
leaving utterly unsettled whether the Superior Court 
was also correct in its interpretation of the state consti- 
tution, or whether Bakke might have won under some 
other provision of state law. 
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court said 
nothing respecting the proper interpretation or appli- 
cation of that state constitutional provision. Indeed, in 
nearly all circumstances, the United States Supreme 
Court deems itself incompetent to decide such ques- 
tions (i.e., doubtful questions respecting the meaning - 
as opposed to the federal constitutionality - of state 
laws, including state constitutional law). Rather, unless 
an interpretation by a state supreme court of a state 
constitutional provision brings that provision into con- 
flict with some overriding federal law (or unless the 
state supreme court construes a state constitutional pro- 
vision as having the same meaning as a parallel provi- 
sion in the federal constitution), the general practice of 
the United States Supreme Court is to refuse to review 
not only the state constitutional provision (which it has 
no expertise superior to that of the state's own highest 
court to interpret), but also the case itself. 
The reason for this general practice is quite plain and 
can be illustrated by reference to the Bakke case. If the 
Supreme Court of California were to hold that, regard- 
less of what the fourteenth amendment would permit 
the Davis Medical School to do in its use of race, the 
California Constitution commits the state and all of its 
instrumentalities to a strict "colorblind" standard, then 
that holding fully adjudicates the controversy, renders 
it gratuitous to address any other issue, and puts a final 
end to the litigation. 
The fact is, therefore, that institutions utilizing race 
as a factor which operates to deny to any person that 
which they might otherwise have been eligible or enti- 
tled to receive, may still confront separate restrictions 
arising from "mini-equal-protection clauses" in the 
constitutions of the states in which those public institu- 
tions are located. While it would be surprising if many 
such state constitutional provisions were construed in 
such a fashion, by no means would it be without prece- 
dent. In recent years, a number of state high courts 
(including most of all the California Supreme Court) 
have declined to read parallel state constitutional provi- 
sions as yielding only the same kind of "due process" or 
"equal protection" as the United States Supreme Court 
has more conservatively interpreted those phrases in 
the fourteenth amendment. Ironically, Mr. Justice 
Brennan has himself written a lengthy article urging 
state supreme courts to take a more lively and inde- 
pendent view of the generally moribund subject of state 
constitutional law. It bears attention, then, that the 
possibility of such a development further complicates 
the post-Bakke era. 
There is yet another countervailing possibility as 
well, to be sure so remarkable that indeed it may call 
down a full-throated cry: "The first thing we do, let's 
kill all the lawyers." Quite apart from the two federal 
sources of law relied upon by Allan Bakke (successfully, 
as it turned out), i.e., Title VI and the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, there remain 
other federal statutes in the field. One of these is itself 
subject to an interpretation that it imposes a strict 
"colorblind" standard on all colleges and universities in 
determining admissions, whether those colleges are pri- 
vate (rather than public), and whether or not they are 
recipients of federal financial assistance. The statute (42 
U.S.C. § 1981) reads as follows: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make 
and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citi- 
zens .... 
In 1968, a majority of the Supreme Court construed this 
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federal statute not simply to invalidate state laws dis- 
abling black persons from making enforceable agree- 
ments (the statute dates from the Reconstruction era), 
but to provide a private cause of action against private 
refusals to contract with black persons when the refus- 
ing party would have been willing to make the same 
contract with a white citizen. In 1976, moreover, the 
Supreme Court held that § 1981 is applicable to schools 
in respect to their admissions policy, i.e., that a refusal 
to admit a black person under circumstances where a 
white citizen would be admitted denies to that black 
person "the same right ... to make and enforce con- 
tracts" (of matriculation). The cases in which these 
matters were settled were Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), and Runyon v. McCrary, 427 
U.S. 160 (1976). 
The case of most immediate significance, however, is 
a third case which appears to hold that, despite its 
wording, § 1981 is a "two-way street, " i.e., that it 
equally forbids racial discrimination against white per- 
sons (and in favor of black persons) as it forbids racial 
discrimination against black persons (and in favor of 
white persons). The case is McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). Mr. Justice Marshall 
concluded (at p. 295): 
[T]he Act was meant ... to proscribe discrimination in the 
making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, 
any race. 
Neither the Runyon case nor the McDonald case was 
available when Allan Bakke's case was first filed, in 
1974. Thus, it is not surprising that his complaint failed 
to challenge the Davis plan under § 1981, quite apart 
from the challenges brought under the California Con- 
stitution, Title VI, and the fourteenth amendment. 
Correspondingly, there is nothing the least remarkable 
in the fact that the possible application of § 1981 to 
racial preferential admission programs (whether of the 
Davis type or of the more general, "diversity" type 
approved by Mr. Justice Powell) was not dealt with in 
Bakke. 
The appearance of these cases plus the dictum by 
Mr. Justice Marshall in the McDonald case does, none- 
theless, raise one more item of instability regarding the 
uncertain implications of Bakke. Here, however, unlike 
the possible state supreme court "colorblind" inter- 
pretations of state constitutions (a possibility that I do 
think is not a remote one), it is not likely that § 1981 
would be applied with the full force of the Marshall 
dictum in the McDonald case or, at least, not in a 
manner forbidding "diversity" type plans approved by 
Mr. Justice Powell. A careful reading of Mr. Justice 
Brennan's opinion will be convincing to any reader, I 
think, that neither he nor the other three Justices (in- 
cluding Marshall) would construe § 1981 in any fashion 
to forbid any kind of admissions program not otherwise 
inconsistent with his view of the equal protection 
clause. The same may very well be true of Mr. Justice 
Powell - especially as the kind of program he finds con- 
stitutional is one that does not "favor" blacks as a class, 
but rather favors varieties of diversity (of which ethnic- 
ity is but one) only when indifference to such matters 
would otherwise result in an educationally less desir- 
able (because unduly homogeneous) student body. 
Even as to the four Justices holding in favor of Bakke on 
the strength of the plain meaning of Title VI, the very 
different language of § 1981 yields no such plain mean- 
ing here. Moreover, since a majority of the Court has 
construed Title VI (a far more recent Act of Congress 
than § 1981) to permit federally assisted universities to 
consider race in ways not forbidden by the fourteenth 
amendment, it would be surprising if any of them were 
now to conclude that § 1981 disallows what the 
fourteenth amendment and Title VI alike are deemed 
to permit. While one cannot be certain of the outcome, 
it therefore seems unlikely that § 1981 will foreclose 
admission policies derived from Mr. Justice Powell's 
position - for such institutions as may wish to proceed 
in that fashion. 
Conclusion 
This brief article is advisedly described as "a pre- 
liminary report." It is merely expository, and it will 
assuredly soon be overtaken by subsequent events. For 
the time being, it may be the better part of wisdom to 
attempt nothing larger than some uncertain, small, and 
immediate conclusions. If the "past futures" of other 
landmark cases are any sort of reliable guide, one would 
be quite foolish to try to serve any role more serious 
than mere amanuensis to the Court: more often than 
not, the actual future of each such case was utterly 
different from what its most patient critics had sup- 
posed. Frequently, the expanded (or diminished) uses 
were strikingly different from anything one could con- 
scientiously find solid explanation to account for in the 
original opinions. The reader may not think so now 
(deceived as we all are, by hindsight), but this was 
probably true of Brown v. Board of Education itself. 
Assuredly it was true of Baker v. Can, the original 
reapportionment case, which gradually emerged with a 
far more sensational future than was first implied by its 
several opinions. 
Often, "great" cases become so almost entirely be- 
cause of some subsequent use, more ingenious than 
faithful in its application of precedent. And nearly as 
often, of course, seemingly "great" cases become for- 
gotten citations - because of subsequent descriptions 
which diminish them to the vanishing point. (Perhaps a 
good example of such a case [which I wager the reader 
never heard of, and so it serves my point too well] is 
Boyd v. United States, which Mr. Justice Brandeis once 
called "a case that will be remembered as long as civil 
liberty lives in the United States." See Note, The Life 
and Times of Boyd v. United States [1886-1976], Mich- 
igan Law Review, 76 [1978], p. 184.) 
Which way Bakke will go, therefore, is highly in- 
determinate. In the meantime, the minimum proposi- 
tion fairly derived from the case is that racially separate 
and unequal admissions policies in federally assisted 
institutions of higher learning are generally forbidden. 
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Four Justices have reached this conclusion on the basis 
of an implied congressional resolve pursuant to Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act. Mr. Justice Powell locates it in 
the command of the fourteenth amendment. Addition- 
ally, however, he concludes that admissions policies 
structured in good faith, for the different and more 
limited objective of enhancing the quality of lernfrei- 
heit and lehrfreiheit that are the essence of the aca- 
demic enterprise, will not be foreclosed by a tight and 
binding pure "colorblind" interpretation of Title VI or 
the fourteenth amendment. Thus, an educationally de- 
fensible policy that takes care to provide a useful degree 
of ethnic diversity remains within the discretion of both 
public and private institutions. 
If Mr. Justice Powell's distinctions seem too Solo- 
monic, too inclined to cut the use of race into two parts 
neither half of which is pleasing by itself, it may be 
more because he is unduly deferential to higher educa- 
tion rather than not deferential enough. Insofar as he 
(and four other Justices) hold it to be improper for 
universities to use admissions standards as an instrument 
of social reform, they but repeat a position frequently 
urged in other circumstances by many universities. If it 
is wrong for legislative bodies to deform academic stan- 
dards by annexing admissions policies to nonacademic 
uses (as universities themselves have so often main- 
tained), surely it is far less defensible for such institu- 
tions themselves to appropriate the public's largesse for 
political purposes. At least a strong argument can be 
made to this effect when such actions must necessarily 
affect the equal opportunity of persons otherwise enti- 
tled to share in the resources of such institutions and 
whose exclusion becomes a foregone certainty as a di- 
rect and immediate consequence of such a policy. 
From this point of view, Mr. Justice Powell's restraint 
on self-generated university "affirmative action" plans 
merely applies to universities the same self-denying 
ordinance which universities have so often asked of 
legislatures. Institutions of higher learning that would, 
by their own practices, advertise the propriety of using 
their admissions standards for nonacademic objectives, 
may assuredly expect difficulty in thereafter resisting 
legislative bodies quite ready to act generally on that 
kind of concession. Within the academy itself, more- 
over, the principle once having been established, it is to 
be expected that others will press forward as well. In 
brief, far from being antagonistic to higher education, 
this branch of the Powell opinion may well be seen 
hereafter as highly protective of higher education. 
On the other hand, to the extent that the door is left 
ajar to take any account of race (albeit only insofar as 
the failure to do so may deprive the institution of 
perspectives and experiences which are educationally 
germane and which are simply not captured by reliance 
on other factors [e.g., economic adversity]), while it 
leaves Justice Powell's position wholly consistent over- 
all, it does introduce a number of problems to which the 
answers are not clear. For one thing, Mr. Justice Powell 
clearly implies that even this use of race as a limited 
"plus point" factor is allowable only when race is but 
one of several kinds of nonacademic attributes, each of 
which is also used to achieve a broader heterogeneity 
within a given student body. But logically, other than 
as a mere device to make it easier to police the integrity 
of a given plan, there seems to be little reason to add 
this requirement. If it is the educational pertinence of 
race that makes its "plus point" use sufficiently impor- 
tant to escape condemnation by the equal protection 
clause under the circumstances, surely that pertinence 
is not logically lessened simply because no other varie- 
ties of nonacademic attributes (e.g., age, geographic 
origin) were regarded in the same way. Even supposing 
that some may believe such other types of differences 
are at least equally germane in their own way (a matter 
itself readily susceptible to reasonable differences of 
opinion), it has not generally been a requirement of 
equal protection that government must address all parts 
of a given problem as a condition of addressing any part 
of that problem. To the contrary, the case law is entirely 
the other way. In this respect, then, Mr. Justice Powell's 
requirements respecting the institutional use of race in 
achieving a reasonable degree of ethnic diversity con- 
tributory to the educational functions of the university 
may be unduly severe - and not explicable under the 
equal protection clause on which he relied. 
For another, Mr. Justice Powell's deference to higher 
education may assume more than those in higher edu- 
cation are frankly able to show. The claim that ethnic 
diversity within a student body is important to the 
overall quality of the university is often asserted, highly 
plausible, almost certainly true - and yet extremely vul- 
nerable. By no means have we undertaken to prove the 
claim in any fashion that would ordinarily be required 
otherwise to sustain the use of a "suspect classifica- 
tion." By no means are most institutions in a position to 
rationalize the particular number or percentage of eth- 
nically diverse students they desire on such a basis, or to 
defend the degree of "plus point" emphasis given to 
this kind of diversity vis-4-vis other kinds. The solici- 
tude thus displayed in Mr. Justice Powell's analysis for 
the special relevance of race to the educational func- 
tions of universities, while genuinely gratifying, is prob- 
ably more generous than we might ourselves think con- 
stitutionally tolerable if it were instead granted to 
noneducational public bodies. 
Taken on broader terms still, moreover, the position 
is also vulnerable to the criticism that Robert Bork has 
offered. (Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1978, p. 8). Pro- 
fessor Bork finds it at least as plausible that in some 
circumstances "a university could believe that educa- 
tion is more effective under conditions of genuine ho- 
mogeneity and so count against applicants, among 
other factors, the fact of being black, female, Chicano, 
etc. Nobody supposes for a moment that such a policy, 
however sincerely adopted, would be shielded . . . from 
the fourteenth [amendment]." One need not read the 
Powell opinion in nearly so permissive a fashion, of 
course; presumably something more than the institu- 
tional assertion of a good-faith belief in such a proposi- 
tion would surely be demanded. Still, even regarded 
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more moderately, Professor Bork has a strong point 
which underscores the weakness just noted: exactly 
what evidence are those of us who would grant "plus 
points'* on the basis of race prepared to provide in 
demonstration that we have hard evidence, and not just 
a good-faith belief, that ethnic diversity within a stu- 
dent body is educationally significant? If, moreover, 
Mr. Justice Powell's deference to higher education does 
indeed stand on a wholly neutral application of the 
equal protection clause, would he be prepared to sus- 
tain a system of "plus points" assigned to produce an 
ethnically homogeneous public college student body if 
that college furnished equivalently convincing evi- 
dence in the educational defense of its policy? 
Behind criticisms such as these (many more of which 
must doubtless appear as the case is explored else- 
where), I think there is a constitutional issue that will 
indeed present extremely great problems in the after- 
math of the Bakke case. The problem, stated in terms of 
Mr. Justice Powell's own address to the proper constitu- 
tional standard, is this. Mr. Justice Powell treats all 
racial classifications (and not simply those disadvanta- 
geous to historically disfavored groups, whoever that 
may include) as constitutionally "suspect." Accord- 
ingly, such classifications are to be sustained only if 
they survive "the most exacting judicial scrutiny," a 
standard ordinarily demanding that the public neces- 
sity for such a classification be more than merely rea- 
sonable - but that it be very great indeed. Yet, in the 
dispensation the Powell opinion provides to higher edu- 
cation, the purpose to be served, as important as educa- 
tors may deem it to be, is at best a purpose to furnish a 
better learning environment for all of the students - a 
purpose not exactly overwhelming or even nationally 
compelling. 
Dissenting in DeFunis v. Odegaard (416 U.S. 312, 
320, 341, 343 [1974]), the precursor to Bakke (dismissed 
for moot ness), Mr. Justice Douglas anticipated this 
problem and declared: 
The argument is that a "compelling" state interest can 
easily justify the racial discrimination that is practiced here. 
[The DeFunis case involved a state law school admissions 
policy quite similar to the one in Bakke.] 
If discrimination based on race is constitutionally per- 
missible when those who hold the reins can come up with 
"compelling" reasons to justify it, then constitutional guar- 
antees acquire an accordionlike quality. 
That way of putting the matter, that there is "an 
accordionlike quality" built into the Supreme Court's 
superintendence of the shifting, changing, but never- 
ceasing insistence by government to use race in one 
way or another, describes the essence of the problem 
very well. There was, however, even as the Court itself 
noted, no party to the case nor even a single amicus 
prepared to assert the view that "our constitution is 
color-blind" and "does not . . . permit any public au- 
thority to know the race of those entitled to be pro- 
tected in the enjoyment of ... civil rights, common to 
all citizens." (Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552, 554, 559 [1896]). 
The fact is that we somehow remain incorrigibly 
optimistic about the capacity of our political processes 
to generate explicitly racial decisions less dubious than 
virtually all such decisions that have characterized our 
history. The Supreme Court is evidently inclined even 
now to be deferential to that permissive view of the 
fourteenth amendment. Perhaps still another half-cen- 
tury from now we can say better whether that kind of 
optimism and that kind of deference were sound. 
A Postscript on the Brennan Opinion: The Consti- 
tutionality of Universal Racial Quotas. 
It may strike the reader as curious that the few criti- 
cal remarks advanced in this article have been directed 
only to Mr. Justice Powell's opinion - despite the fact 
that the opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan spoke 
for four times as many Justices (and thus may be far 
more likely to become the prevailing view on the con- 
stitutional issue). I have no very good excuse for that 
omission, except that the view advanced by Mr. Justice 
Brennan was one which had been repeatedly put for- 
ward (and just as often criticized) elsewhere - a matter 
not true of Mr. Justice Powell's view, which therefore 
seemed worthwhile to examine here. Because I am 
reluctant to review still again all that has already been 
said by others in urging upon the Court the view 
adopted by Mr. Justice Brennan (and Justices White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun), I think it is simply more 
appropriate to deal with it briefly, as an extended post- 
script. In that way, these few observations will carry no 
pretense that they are either original or exhaustive. 
If Mr. Justice Powell's opinion is properly subject to 
the mild criticism that at its edges, it has "an accord- 
ionlike quality," that difficulty is magnified in the vastly 
more permissive standard of judicial review urged in 
the Brennan opinion. Here, the door is not merely ajar 
for racial classifications: it is opened so wide that there 
may issue wholesale political licenses for racial quotas 
in nearly every avenue of public life. Essentially, the 
proposed constitutional standard is that the govern- 
ment may use racial double standards whenever they 
are "designed to further remedial purposes." The scope 
of racial quotas which may be targeted pursuant to this 
test is evidently very broad. It may best be seen in 
comparison with a much more limited use of such stan- 
dards "for remedial purposes." 
In his dissenting opinion in DeFunis, Mr. Justice 
Douglas noted that the use of standardized admission 
tests may work an inadvertent unfairness to minority 
applicants: it is entirely possible that a test instrument 
generally effective in forecasting the likelihood of stu- 
dents to do more or less well in a given field of graduate 
study may be ineffective (or at least less effective) in 
respect to identifiable ethnic cohorts within the total 
group. He suggested, therefore, that insofar as a given 
admissions criterion were flawed in this respect, i.e., 
when applied indiscriminately to all students, utiliza- 
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tion of different or supplemental criteria more respon- 
sive to identifiable subgroups would be wholly constitu- 
tional. 
The use of such additional and/or different criteria 
for ethnic minority applicants, under such circum- 
stances, would be "remedial" and yet not "discrimina- 
tory." They would be remedial of defects discovered to 
exist within the general test insofar as the indiscrimi- 
nate application of that test to ethnic minorities could 
be shown to "underpredict" their actual graduate 
school performance when admitted to the same curricu- 
lum and when examined on equal terms with all other 
admittees. They would not be discriminatory, however, 
insofar as the use of the different (or additional) criteria 
for ethnic minorities merely achieves the same degree 
of reliability of prediction for them as is already 
achieved by the general test as applied to all others. 
Indeed, in the DeFunis case itself, while wholly dis- 
approving the University of Washington's "justifica- 
tions" for its racial dual admission standards, Mr. Jus- 
tice Douglas voted to remand the case - to provide the 
university with an opportunity to show that its racially 
differentiated standards were, if only by coincidence, 
defensible in these terms. 
Unquestionably, racially explicit separate standards 
"designed to further remedial purposes" in this limited 
and specific sense, are clearly constitutional. Indeed, 
under at least one federal statute they are, in certain 
circumstances, already required as a matter of federal 
law. Thus, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(applicable to all employers of fifteen or more employ- 
ees) has been construed to require that insofar as an 
employer's hiring or promotion standards tend in the 
first instance to exclude a disproportionate percentage 
of ethnic minority applicants, those standards must be 
re-examined to determine whether they are inadvert- 
ently "discriminatory" in the sense just explained. If 
they are, the employer must supplement them with, or 
substitute for them, criteria as separately validated in 
their application to minority applicants as are the cri- 
teria applied to other applicants. 
At the same time, it is quite clear that "affirmative 
action" of this kind is both legal and constitutional 
when voluntarily undertaken by a public or private 
enterprise (including a college), even when not re- 
quired either by the fourteenth amendment or by any 
other law. Indeed, the legitimacy of such an approach is 
obviously not confined only to instances when dispro- 
portionately few ethnic minority students might other- 
wise be admitted. It is entirely possible that a given test 
or standard "underpredicts" the probable performance 
of such persons who, given the just benefit of a correc- 
tion in that standard, would as a group fare even better 
than the "average." Assuredly, nothing in the concept 
of equal protection suggests that their equality of op- 
portunity as individuals should be restricted by any 
notion that their chance for admission on merit should 
be artificially restricted by the proportion of persons of 
their same race in the population at large or the popu- 
lation of applicants. 
If this example either exhausted or illustrated what 
Mr. Justice Brennan meant by acknowledging the con- 
stitutional propriety of race-related differential admis- 
sion standards "designed to further remedial pur- 
poses," it would surely be uncontroversial. If standard 
admissions criteria inadvertently carry built in head- 
winds against individuals whose equal or superior capa- 
bilities or motivation are being unfairly overlooked (be- 
cause of oversights in the instruments used to compare 
them with other applicants), they should surely be 
modified; their maintenance provides an unjust advan- 
tage to others and denies the university what it meant 
to have. 
The use of racially differentiated standards "designed 
to further remedial purposes" in this corrective way, 
however, is not at all what the Brennan opinion intends. 
Rather, the view of "remedial purposes" is utterly dif- 
ferent. It is that racial double standards are permissible 
not to remedy any defect inherent in the uniform appli- 
cation of a single admissions standard - but useful, 
rather, to furnish a cohort of less qualified students to 
fill a minimum racial quota which the university deems 
to be appropriate in the amortization of the national 
racial debt. Succinctly stated, it is the object of the 
arrangement to inaugurate a limited example of race 
reparations pursuant to which a scarce public good is to 
be divided among racial groups, with applicants from 
"victimized" groups to be considered more per- 
missively as a means of redress for that antecedent 
victimization. 
The effect of such arrangements is necessarily to dis- 
place certain persons from positions and from opportu- 
nities they would otherwise have filled but for which 
they are now rendered ineligible because they are (a) 
white and (b) not sufficiently better qualified than all 
other whites as to be safely beyond the exclusionary 
effect of the racial minority set-aside quotas. The theory 
according to which it is thought reasonable to proceed 
in this fashion is that all persons for whom the racial set- 
asides are reserved are more deserving (whether or not 
substantially less qualified) than any person displaced 
by the arrangement in at least one important respect: 
racial victimization - if not personally and directly 
(which need not be shown), then at least impersonally 
and indirectly (which may safely be assumed), through 
three centuries of white racism in American history. 
And so the opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan advances 
accordingly: 
[I]t is clear from our cases that specific proof that a person 
has been victimized by discrimination is not a necessary 
predicate to offering him relief where the probability of 
victimization is great. 
And thus: 
True, whites are excluded from participation in the special 
admissions program, but this fact only operates to reduce 
the number of whites to be admitted in the regular admis- 
sions program in order to permit admission of a reasonable 
percentage- not less than their proportion of the California 
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population- of otherwise underrepresented qualified mi- 
nority applicants. 
Viewed head on, as a modus operandi for the amorti- 
zation of the national racial debt, without doubt there is 
much about the Davis plan that is plainly repugnant. 
For one thing, it represents a most peculiar view of 
apportioning the burdens of providing racial restitu- 
tion. The "benefits" of that racism for which the Davis 
plan presumes to make partial group restitution are 
diffused in the "unjust" enrichment of all white Califor- 
nians including most certainly the engineers of this 
compensatory scheme, i.e., the (predominantly white) 
faculty and administration of the Davis medical school. 
Yet the overwhelming majority of all such white per- 
sons give up nothing in contribution to the amortization 
of that debt. They pay no higher taxes, the faculty teach 
no greater loads, they supervise no larger number of 
students, they personally forego no perquisites or 
emoluments, and indeed may themselves even profit 
from their own plan - insofar as it provides them with 
an enhanced sense of self-esteem and peer-group ap- 
proval. Rather, the Davis plan presumes to impose 100 
per cent of the "debt" it is to amortize on a hapless 
number of impersonally chosen surrogates from whom 
admission-gate transfer payments are thus to be made. 
The Allan Bakkes and Marco DeFunises alone step 
aside. 
There is, of course, no evidence that any of them 
benefited disproportionately (if indeed at all) from the 
racism it is now their exclusive distinction to amortize; 
there is no evidence that any of them are better able to 
afford the cost than others. More likely persons than 
Bakke would, surely, include highly favored students 
accepted at several schools and not just a near miss at 
Davis (as was Allan Bakke) - but in fact none of them 
(nor any other citizen or taxpayer or officeholder in 
California) pays anything. More likely persons than 
Bakke would, surely, include persons so cushioned by 
family connection that even exclusion from every medi- 
cal school is no lasting hardship - as Bakke was not 
cushioned (not, at least, by family connection, as he 
came from a working-class family [his father was a 
postman]). In brief, the Davis plan as an engine for 
amortizing the national racial debt is a zero-sum game 
which arbitrarily disadvantages a few whites very 
greatly indeed and no one else at all, a system of racial 
transfer payments enforced at the gates of a state uni- 
versity medical school. 
Appraised calmly, moreover, it is not surprising that 
both Allan Bakke and Marco DeFunis came from work- 
ing class families. Demographically, that is in keeping 
with what the faculty and administration at Davis 
should anticipate. The system of racial transfer pay- 
ments is perfectly calculated to dissipate its entire im- 
pact on otherwise "marginal" white applicants, i.e., 
those from circumstances least profiting from the an- 
tecedent racism in America and among the least able to 
pay that debt. So it is, too, in virtually every other area 
where like proposals are entertained - a matter per- 
fectly well understood by them and quite adequately 
explaining the high degree of resentment that whites at 
the margin entertain to the noblesse oblige of Davis- 
type plans. 
Yet Mr. Justice Brennan has a reply to these very 
objections, and perhaps he is quite right: 
If it was reasonable to conclude- as we hold that it was- 
that the failure of minorities to qualify for admissions at 
Davis under regular procedures was due principally to the 
effects of past discrimination, then there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, but for pervasive racial discrimination, re- 
spondent would have failed to qualify for admission even in 
the absence of Davis's special admissions program. 
Viewed that way (and it is not an unreasonable way), 
the Davis plan itself is not flawed. Rather, insofar as the 
objection I have sought to raise still has any force, it is 
only an objection to the incompleteness of the system. 
What is "needed" is not the dismantling of the Davis 
plan, but rather its systematic imitation and duplication 
in every other area of public life as well. If an Allan 
Bakke would have failed to qualify but for the effects of 
past discrimination which explains the disproportionate 
failure of minority applicants to have done as well or 
better than he, it is surely likely that this is equally true 
not just at the margin of competition for access to the 
Davis medical school - but at the margin of com- 
petition for all jobs, for all government contracts, etc., 
including appointment to the Davis faculty (and com- 
petition for scarce space in the publication of articles in 
professional journals), everywhere for everything cur- 
rently allocated by mere standards of competitive ex- 
cellence rather than such standards as uniformly modi- 
fied by compensatory racial minority set-asides. 
The more subtle "problem" (if there is a problem, for 
some do not see any) of the Brennan rationale, there- 
fore, is in its very doubtful destiny as an instrument to 
end racism in the United States. The law, even as the 
Supreme Court noted in Brown v. Board of Education, 
is a powerful educative source. It communicates a sense 
of what is right, it inculcates habits of thought, quite 
apart from the coercion it may impose. In the Bakke 
case, the Brennan opinion is at pains to insist that 
although the Davis plan plainly favors less capable 
students over more capable students differentiated bas- 
ically by race, those to whom these transfer payments 
are made are not "stigmatized" by the auspices of their 
special admission and assuredly they have no reason to 
feel "grateful." Far from being patronized, what they 
get is, rather, a matter of simple justice: a matter of just 
racial redress. They do not "take" from an Allan Bakke, 
for such a view is itself rife with white racism: it unac- 
ceptably assumes that whites affected adversely by the 
plan had something properly to be thought of as 
"theirs." Davis has assured them that this is not so. Mr. 
Justice Brennan assures them that Davis is reasonable 
in saying so. If both are right, they are at least equally 
right in every other category and every other walk of 
life in America. In brief, it is at once wrong and uncon- 
scionable not to provide systematic racial minority set- 
asides elsewhere, fixing target quotas to be filled by less 
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rigorous standards applicable only to disadvantaged ra- 
cial minority persons, as an equitable and broadly dis- 
tributed means of amortizing the national racial debt. 
Generalized as a standard of constitutional review, 
the maxim of the Davis plan is thus one that emphat- 
ically inculcates not colorblindness but extraordinary 
race-conscious restructuring of some indefinitely 
" tran- 
sitional' ' social order by state and national systems rep- 
licating whole tiers of racial quotas. A plurality of four 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court thus finds 
congenial to the Constitution a theory of racial quotas 
and racial double standards quite sufficient to fuel a 
generation or more of ethnic politics under a new order 
which will consciously distribute opportunity in this 
country by explicit racial percentages and specific eth- 
nic classifications. 
Yet it is the firmly held view of many persons (to use 
the language employed by Mr. Justice Blackmun in his 
opinion fully concurring with Mr. Justice Brennan) that 
"in order to get beyond racism, we must first take 
account of race" in precisely this fashion. It is seriously 
suggested that at some future time, presumably when 
the racial national debt will have been appropriately 
amortized, race consciousness may at last be encour- 
aged to fade from each person's thinking under a Con- 
stitution which at last shall be construed "not to permit 
any public authority to know the race of those entitled 
to be protected in the enjoyment of civil rights, com- 
mon to all citizens." That the contemplation of this 
transitional society, with its established layers of racial 
quotas, could truly be thought by anyone as more likely 
to eradicate race-consciousness, racial politics, or racism 
in the United States than any other alternative avail- 
able, and not itself to become a permanently en- 
trenched feature in an utterly race-conscious America, 
seems to be perfectly remarkable. But I sincerely hope 
that I am wrong, because this view of the matter is on 
the very edge of becoming the prevailing view of wnat 
will pass as the enlightened application of "equal pro- 
tection of the laws." 
The Anatomy Lesson 
October. 
On eight stainless steel tables eight long packages lay 
Each shrouded in green toweling; each wrapped in 
Clear plastic. 
We unwrap our gifts with care 
And as we lift the covers 
My students are probably thinking 
Grandpa or Grandma, 
Uncle Max or Aunt Sadie. 
I remember my father, wasted by cancer. 
The last time I saw him he didn't see me, 
His face dull silver against white sheets. 
I try not to see my mother. 
So many of her friends are here. 
For a moment 
I see myself. 
All through the winter I'm enthralled. 
Captured, bound, enfolded. 
Awake, asleep, my thoughts shuttle back and forth 
Weaving a tangled plexus of science and sentiment. 
Day by night and night by day 
These bodies surrender their secrets. 
Day by night and night by day 
These bodies tug at my lab coat and whisper, 
'Live." 
George J. Fruhman 
Albert Einstein College of Medicine 
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